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ON A NEW CLASS OF PARALLEL SEQUENCING
SITUATIONS AND RELATED GAMES




On a new class of parallel sequencing situations and related
games
Pedro Calleja , Peter Borm y, Herbert Hamersy, Flip Klijny z
Abstract: This paper considers a special class of sequencing situations with two
parallel machines in which each agent has precisely two jobs to be processed, one on
each machine. The costs of an agent depend linearly on the nal completion time of his
jobs. We describe a procedure that provides an optimal processing order of the jobs.
Furthermore, we study cooperative games arising from these sequencing situations. Our
main result is balancedness of these games.
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cation Number: C71
Keywords: cooperative game theory, scheduling, balancedness, convexity
1 Introduction
Sequencing or scheduling situations nd their origin in the processing and manufactur-
ing industries, but also arise in computing, business and service industries. The specic
problems we consider in this paper are those arising from situations where some com-
plementary jobs, in the sense that they cannot be processed on the same machine, need
to be nished in order to obtain the nal output.
Typical examples are the production processes of cars, or other manufacturing ac-
tivities where dierent elements of the nal output are processed on dierent machines
before being assembled. Other examples include scheduling tasks that have to be pro-
cessed by the C.P.U. of a computer in order to obtain the nal result.
To clarify the problem consider a construction rm that has to install some dierent
services like electricity, gas, water, etc. in some houses. The houses can be of a dierent
type and the time needed to provide each service to the houses can also be dierent.
Each service is provided by one specic specialist and hence, the same service cannot
be provided to two houses at the same time. The rm incurs costs for each house until
the house is ready for sale, i.e., until all services have been provided. These costs will
vary between the houses.
The rst problem the rm in the above situation faces is the problem of nding an
optimal schedule in providing the services to the houses, i.e., a schedule that minimizes
the total costs.
Department of Economic, Financial and Actuarial Mathematics, University of Barcelona, Av. Di-
agonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Corresponding author. e-mail: calleja@eco.ub.es
yDepartment of Econometrics and Operations Research, and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O.Box
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A subsequent problem the rm may face is how to allocate the total costs in the
optimal schedule to the houses. The need for such an allocation can be, for example,
for accounting reasons. Let us assume that initially there exists an initial schedule in
providing the services to the houses. Say, the schedule based on the rst-come, rst-
served principle. Then the optimal schedule can dier from the initial one. In that
case, there are houses that in the optimal schedule would be oered for sale later than
in the initial schedule due to other, high priority houses (e.g. higher market prices)
being earlier. In this case, one may argue that the high priority houses are responsible
for part of the increases in the costs for low priority houses. The remaining problem is
which allocations of the total costs may be considered \fair".
The \fair" allocation of costs is one of the main issues that is addressed in coopera-
tive game theory. Establishing a relation between scheduling problems and cooperative
games will enable us to obtain \fair" cost allocations. By assuming that there exists an
initial schedule before the machines (services) start processing (providing the service),
one can establish a relation between cooperative games and sequencing situations in
the following way. Under the assumption that each job (house)is owned by an agent,
a group of agents (a coalition) can save costs by rearranging their jobs in a way that
is admissible with respect to this initial schedule. By dening the value of a coalition
as the maximal cost savings a coalition can make in this way, we obtain a cooperative
sequencing game related to the sequencing situation.
In this regard the core of a cooperative game comes to mind. Roughly speaking, a
core allocation divides the costs in such a way that, for each group of agents their total
costs in the optimal schedule plus the additional costs allocated to them does not exceed
the total costs they can obtain by exchanging their places in the initial schedule in an
admissible way. Core allocations, however, need not always exist. If a core allocation
exists for a cooperative game, the game is called balanced. In this paper we show that
under specic conditions on parallel scheduling problems the corresponding games are
balanced.
The above game-theoretic approach to sequencing situations was initiated by Curiel,
Pederzoli and Tijs (1989) by considering the class of one-machine sequencing situations.
It was shown that the corresponding sequencing games are convex and, thus, balanced.
Hamers, Borm and Tijs (1995) extended the class of one machine sequencing situations
considered by Curiel et al. (1989) by imposing ready times on the jobs. The correspon-
ding sequencing games are balanced, but are not necessarily convex. Similar results are
also obtained in Borm, Fiestras-Janeiro, Hamers, Sanchez and Voorneveld (1999) in
which due dates are imposed on the jobs. Instead of imposing intrinsic restrictions on
the jobs, Van den Nouweland, Krabbenborg and Potters (1992) extended the number
of machines. Here m-machines sequencing situations are considered associated to ow
shops situations with a so-called dominant machine. Convexity was established for a
special subclass. In general, however, the corresponding games need not be balanced.
Finally, Hamers, Klijn and Suijs (1999) consider m-parallel and identical machines
sequencing situations, and prove the balancedness of the related games in some special
cases.
This paper considers sequencing situations with two parallel machines. Contrary to
other papers in this eld, it is assumed that each agent owns two jobs to be processed,
one on each machine. The costs of an agent depend linearly on the nal completion
time of his jobs. In other words, it depends on the time an agent has to wait until both
his jobs have been processed. A formal description of the model and some results in
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providing optimal schedules of the jobs of the agents on the machines are presented in
Section 2.
In Section 3, we introduce games related to this type of sequencing situations. These
games are studied with respect to convexity and 0-component additivity (cf. Curiel,
Potters, Rajendra Prasad, Tijs and Veltman (1993, 1994)).
In Section 4, the games are studied with respect to balancedness. We derive condi-
tions such that the core of the games is non-empty: a specic marginal vector lies in the
core. The proof of this result is technically quite involved. Most of these technicalities
are concentrated in an Appendix.
Finally, in Section 5, we conclude with some remarks on possible extensions to the
general m-parallel machines case.
2 The model
In this section, we start with describing the specic sequencing situations with 2 parallel
machines that we study in the paper. After that, we provide some results on the optimal
processing order of the jobs on the machines for some special situations.
The set of the two machines is denoted by M = f1; 2g. There is a nite set of
agents N = f1; :::; ng. We assume that each agent has 2 jobs to be processed, one on
each machine.
Moreover, we assume that each machine starts processing at time 0 and by the
vector (pi; qi)i2N we denote the processing times of the jobs of every agent i; pi  0 for
the job to be processed on machine 1 and qi  0 for the job to be processed on machine
2. We also assume that there is an initial scheme (; ') of the jobs on the machines
where  and ' are the initial orders for the rst and the second machine, respectively.
Formally,  and ' are bijections from N to f1; 2; :::; ng where (i) = s and '(i) = t
mean that initially, player i has a job in position s on machine 1 and a job in position t
on machine 2 in the initial queues before the machines. Let
Q
(N) be the set of orders




(N)denotes the set of
possible schemes.
Concerning the costs of spending time in the system, every agent has a linear cost
function ci : [0;1)! R dened by ci(t) = it where i > 0,and where t represents the
time player i has to wait to have both his jobs processed.
A 2 parallel machines sequencing situation is a 5-tuple
(M;N; (; '); (i)i2N ; (pi; qi)i2N ) and we will refer to it as a 2 PS situation. Notice
that 2 PS situations generalize the class of sequencing situations studied by Curiel et
al. (1989).








the completion time Ci() of the job of agent i on the rst machine with respect to
the order . Similarly, Ci() :=
P
j2N :(j)(i)
qi denotes the completion time of the job
of agent i on the second machine with respect to  . Considering as relevant for every
player the moment he can leave the system, we consider the nal completion time with
respect to (; ), that is Ci(; ) := max fCi(); Ci()g. Then the total costs of the
agents with respect to (; ) can be written as









(N) is called optimal for N if total costs are minimized,
i.e.,







The following proposition can be useful in nding an optimal scheme.
Proposition 2.1 For a 2 PS situation:
1) There exists an optimal scheme (̂; ̂) with ̂ = ̂ .
2) If pi = qi for all i 2 N then for any optimal scheme (̂; ̂ ) it holds that ̂ = ̂
Proof. 1) We are done if we show that for any scheme (; ) with  6=  we can
construct a weakly better scheme (~; ~ ) with ~ = ~ , i.e., cN (; )  cN (~; ~).
Let (; ) be a scheme with  6=  . Then going from the last position to the rst
position, we will nd a position s with dierent players on the two machines, i.e.,
s = max ft 2 f1; :::; ng : 9 i; j 2 N i 6= j such that (i) = (j) = tg.
Related to position s we dene the sets of players
I(s) = fi 2 N : (i) = s or (i) = sg and
I(s) = fi 2 I(s) : Ci(; )  Ci(; ) for all i 2 I(s)g.
We construct a weakly better scheme (~; ~) as follows. We choose a player i 2 I(s).
Without loss of generality, assume that i has position s on the rst machine, i.e.,




(i)  1 if (i) > (i) and (i)  s
s if i = i
(i) if (i) < (i) or (i) > s
:
Hence, ~(i) = ~(i) = s. It is obvious that on the rst machine Ci(~) = Ci()
for all i 2 N . It is easy to check that on the second machine Ci(~)  Ci() for all
i 2 Nn fig, and Ci(; )  Ci(~; ~). Graphically:


3 1 2 4
2 1 3 4
~
~
3 1 2 4
1 3 2 4
where s = 3 and i = 2.
Considering now the scheme (~; ~), by repeating the same argument we obtain a
scheme as desired.
2) Let (; ) be a scheme with  6=  . We construct a strictly better scheme (~; ~)
with ~ = ~ . We use the same argument as in 1). It is easy to see that from pi = qi
for all i 2 N it follows that I(s) = I(s). Constructing the same new scheme (~; ~ ) as
before, we realize that Ci (~; ~) = Ci(; ) and for player j
 2 I(s), j 6= i it holds
Cj (~; ~ ) < Cj(; ). Consequently cN (~; ~) < cN (; ). 2
Although the problem of nding an optimal scheme for the general case is
NP-hard we can present the following result for some specic problems. Following






as the urgency of player i on machine 1
and 2; respectively.
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Proposition 2.2 For a 2 PS situation with pi = qi for all i 2 N it holds that (̂; ̂)
is an optimal scheme if and only if
̂(i)  ̂(j), ui  uj for all i; j 2 N (1)




i for all i 2 N .





i 2 N: First we show the only if part. Suppose (̂; ̂) is an optimal scheme that does not
satisfy (1). Then there exist two players i; j 2 N such that ̂(i) = ̂(j)+1 and ui > uj.





̂(j) if k = i
̂(i) if k = j
̂(k) if k 6= i; j
:
Then it holds that
cN (̂; ̂)  cN (~; ~) = jCj(̂; ̂) + iCi(̂; ̂)  iCi (~; ~)  jCj (~; ~)
= ipj   jpi > 0
where the last inequality follows from ui > uj . Hence (̂; ̂) is not optimal.
Next we show the if part. Let (̂; ̂) satisfy (1) and let (; ) be an optimal scheme.
Then by proposition 2.1,  =  . From the only if part (; ) satises (1). Now we
can obtain (̂; ̂) from (; ) by switching on both machines adjacent pairs i; j with
ui = uj . This will leave the total costs unchanged, which implies that (̂; ̂) is an
optimal scheme. 2
3 Sequencing games arising from 2 PS situations
In this section we introduce two classes of cooperative games that arise from the se-
quencing situations discussed in section 2. A transferable utility game (a game, for
short) is a pair (N; v) where N is a nite set of players and v is a function v : 2N ! R
with v(;) = 0; and 2N the collection of all subsets or coalitions of N . If no confusion
can arise a game (N; v) will be denoted by its characteristic function v.
Let (M;N; (; '); (i)i2N ; (pi; qi)i2N ) be a 2 PS situation. The maximal cost sav-
ings of a set of players S  N depend on the set of admissible rearrangements of this
set of agents S. We call a scheme (; ) to be an admissible rearrangement for S with
respect to (; ') if it satises: two agents i; j 2 S can only switch in one machine if
all agents in between i and j on that machine with respect to the initial order on that
machine are also members of S. Formally, rst we dene the set of predecessors of
player i 2 N with respect to an order  2
Q
(N) as Pi() := fj 2 N : (j) < (i)g.
Now, given the initial order  2
Q
(N), an admissible order for S on machine 1, is a
bijection  2
Q
(N) such that Pi() = Pi() for all i 2 NnS. Similarly, an admissible
order for S on machine 2 is a bijection  2
Q
(N) such that Pi() = Pi(') for all
i 2 NnS.
Let A1(S) and A2(S) denote the set of admissible rearrangements on machine 1
and machine 2, respectively. The set A1(S)  A2(S) is called the set of admissible
schemes for S. In other words, we consider an scheme to be admissible for S if each
agent outside S has the same completion time on each machine as in the initial order.
Moreover, the agents of S are not allowed to jump over players outside S.
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Then, given a 2 PS situation, the corresponding 2 PS game (N; v) is dened in
such a way that the worth of a coalition S  N is equal to the maximal cost savings





i (Ci(; ')  Ci(; )) :
It is straightforward that any 2 PS game v is monotonic, i.e., for all S  T  N ,
it holds that v(S)  v(T ). This is true since A1(S)A2(S)  A1(T )A2(T ).
It is also easy to see that v is a superadditive game, i.e., for all S; T  N , with
S \ T = ?, it holds that v(S) + v(T )  v(S [ T ). This follows immediately from
the observation that for any admissible scheme (; ) 2 A1(S) A2(S) for S and any
admissible scheme (; ) 2 A1(T )  A2(T ) for T there exists an admissible scheme
(~; ~) 2 A1(S [ T )A2(S [ T ) for S [ T with:
~(i) := (i) and ~(i) := (i) for all i 2 S;
~(i) := (i) and ~(i) := (i) for all i 2 T .
Curiel et al. (1993) introduced the class of 0-component additive games, a well
known class of games which incorporates many 1-machine sequencing situations, that
is balanced.
Given an order 0 2
Q
(N), a bijection from N to f1; 2; :::; ng, a cooperative game
v is called 0-component additive if the following three conditions are satised:
1) v (i) = 0 for all i 2 N ,




v(T ) , where S=0 is the set of all maximally connected components
of S.
A coalition S is called connected with respect to 0 if for all i; j 2 S and k 2 N
such that 0(i) < 0(k) < 0(j) it holds that k 2 S .
Proposition 3.1 Let (M;N; (; '); (i)i2N ; (pi; qi)i2N ) be a 2 PS situation with
 = '. Then the corresponding game (N; v) is -component additive.
Proof. Conditions 1 and 2 hold for any initial scheme (; '). We prove condition
3. First, observe that by superadditivity v(S) 
P
T2S=
















where (̂; ̂) 2 A1(S) A2(S) is an optimal scheme for coalition S. The rst equality
follows from the denition of the game (N; v). The second equality follows from the
observation that  = ' and hence, S= = S='. Consequently (̂; ̂) 2 A1(T )A2(T )
for all T 2 S=, i.e., (̂; ̂) also determines a scheme for each T 2 S=. Moreover,
the inequality follows from (̂; ̂ ) is an optimal scheme for S, but does not need to be
optimal for all T 2 S=. 2
The results presented so far are based on the structure of the problem, without
the need of any information concerning optimal schemes for a coalition S  N . In
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general, as has been stated before, the problem of nding the optimal scheme for the
grand coalition N is NP-hard. Similarly, the problem of nding the optimal scheme
for a coalition S  N is NP-hard, too. Hence, the worth of a coalition S  N cannot
be easily described. Therefore, we henceforth restrict our attention to simple 2 PS
situations.
Denition 3.1 A 2 PS situation (M;N; (; '); (i)i2N ; (pi; qi)i2N ) is called simple if
p := pi = qi = pj = qj for all i; j 2 N and
 := i for all i 2 N:
Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to simple 2 PS situations with
 = 1 and p = 1. Then the cost savings associated to any switch between players are
either 1 or 0 or  1. Furthermore, for a player i 2 N and an order  2
Q
(N) it holds
that Ci() = (i). We denote simple 2 PS situations with the 3 tuple (M;N; (; ')).





(N) for N can be derived easily. For every optimal scheme it holds
that ̂ = ̂ because of proposition 2.1 and pi = qi for all i 2 N . More precisely, by
proposition 2.2 any scheme with ̂ = ̂ will be optimal since for any pair of players
i; j 2 N; i 6= j it holds that ui = uj. The rich structure of simple 2 PS situations
enables us to provide a simple expression for the worth of the grand coalition N in the





















Ci(; ')   (1 + 2 + :::+ jSj);
where the last inequality follows easily by the observation that the costs associated to
optimal schemes equal (1 + 2 + :::+ jSj).
For an arbitrary coalition S  N , however, it is still diÆcult to nd an optimal
scheme (̂; ̂) 2 A1(S) A2(S) or an easy expression for the worth of S. In the next
example we give a simple 2 PS situation with an optimal scheme for coalition S  N
that cannot simply be derived from propositions 2.1 and 2.2.
Example 3.1 Consider the simple 2 PS situation with
N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g, and the initial scheme given by

'
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7 8 5 6 3 4 1 2
The optimal scheme for S = f1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 7; 8g is
̂
̂
3 1 2  5 6 7 8
3 5 6 7 8  1 2
For convenience, in this example and in the following, we leave out all players that
are not in the coalition S. By denition of admissible scheme they will be in the same
position as in the initial scheme. M
In general, 2 PS games arising from 2 PS situations need not be 0-component
additive, not even in simple 2 PS situations as the following example shows.
Example 3.2 Consider the simple 2 PS situation with




1 2 3 4 5
4 1 5 3 2
Suppose that the simple 2 PS game is 0-component additive.
1) Note that v(14) = v(34) = v(35) = 1 and v(i) = 0 for all i 2 N . So f14g, f34g
and f35g have to be connected with respect to 0:
2) Note also that v(234) = 2, v(34) = 1, v(23) = v(24) = 0 and v(i) = 0 for all
i 2 N . So f234g has to be connected with respect to 0:
So, from 1) and 2) it follows that f14g, f34g ; f35g and f234g have to be connected
with respect to 0, but there is no ordering of the ve players that makes that possible.
Hence, v is not 0-component additive. M
A TU-game v is convex if v(T [ fig)  v(T )  v(S [ fig)  v(S) for all i 2 N and
all S  T  Nn fig. As the following example shows 2 PS games neither need to be
convex, not even in simple 2 PS situations.
Example 3.3 Consider the simple 2 PS situation with:
N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9g, and the initial scheme given by:

'
5 6 7 1 2 3 8 9 4
7 8 3 4 5 6 1 9 2
Take S = f1; 3g ; T = f1; 3; 4; 5; 6g and i = 2.
The optimal schemes are:
̂
̂
   3 1 2   
  3    1  2
for S [ fig ;
̂
̂
5 6  1  3   4




5 6  3 1 2   4
  5 3 6 1 4  2
for T [ fig :
v(T [ fig)  v(T ) = 6  6 < 2  0 = v(S [ fig)  v(S).
Hence, v is not convex. M
A game v is said to be balanced if the core C(v) is non empty. The core of the
game v consists of the payo vectors x 2 RN satisfying the conditions x(S)  v(S) for
all S 2 2N and x(N) = v(N).
Although v does not need to be convex nor 0-component additive, not even in
simple 2 PS situations, as examples 3:2 and 3:3 show, we can give core elements for
both examples: (0; 0; 1; 2; 2) and (0; 0; 4; 4; 0; 0; 2; 4; 1), respectively.
Notice that the games (N; v) arising from 1 machine situations are convex and
balanced. Moreover, games arising from 2 PS situations with  = ' are -component
additive games, and as is shown in Curiel et al. (1993) the  rule gives a core element.
For our study of balancedness of 2 PS games, we introduce a new game (N;w)
that will represent some kind of optimistic expectations for a coalition S  N , since
in the new game the players can switch freely on each machine, even if they are not
connected. So we call the game w arising from a 2 PS situation, the optimistic 2 PS
game.
This games will be useful to deal with the problem of nding an optimal scheme
for a coalition S  N , which is NP-hard, even in simple 2 PS situations.





(S) as the bijection from S to f1; 2; :::; jSjg, where the relative positions
8
of the players with respect to  remain unchanged, i.e., S(i) := (i) j fPi() \NnSg j
for all i 2 S.
For any 5-tuple (M;N; (; '); (i)i2N ; (pi; qi)i2N ) and a coalition S  N , we can
associate an induced 2 PS situation to S denoted by the 5-tuple
(M;N; (S ; 'S); (i)i2S ; (pi; qi)i2S). In this induced situation the set of players is S,





2 PS game associated to this induced 2 PS situation is denoted by (S; vS). We call
the game (S; vS) the induced 2 PS game to S.
The worth of a coalition S  N in the optimistic game (N;w) is now dened to be
the worth of the \grand coalition S" in the corresponding induced 2 PS game (S; vS)
to S. Hence w(S) := vS(S) for all S  N . Clearly w(N) = vN (N) = v(N).
Obviously, for a simple 2 PS situation (M;N; (; ')), any induced 2 PS situation
to a coalition S, (M;N; (S ; 'S)) is also a simple 2 PS situation. Consequently, the
game w enables us to work with useful expressions concerning the worth of a coalition
S  N in the game w. In fact,









S ; 'S)  jSj(jSj+1)2
(2)
The following example claries the dierence between v and w.
Example 3.4 Consider the simple 2 PS situation with
N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g, and the initial scheme given by

'
4 1 5 2 6 3
3 2 5 4 6 1






Clearly v(S) = 0 and w(S) = vS(S) = 2: M
The game w, as the game v, does not need to be 0-component additive nor convex,
not even in simple 2 PS situations. This is shown in the next two examples.
Example 3.5 Consider the simple 2 PS situation with









0 if jSj  1
1 if jSj = 2
2 if jSj = 3
The game w is not 0-component additive since there is no ordering of the three
players for which coalitions f1; 2g ; f1; 3g and f2; 3g are connected. M
Example 3.6 Consider the simple 2 PS situation with
N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, and the initial scheme given by

'
1 2 3 4
4 2 3 1
9
Let S = f2; 3g ; T = f1; 2; 3g and i = 4.
Then w(T [ fig)  w(T ) = 3  2 < 2  0 = w(S [ fig)  w(S).
So, the game w is not convex. M
4 On balancedness for simple 2 PS situations
In this section we present the main result of the paper: the games arising from simple
2 PS situations (M;N; (; ')) are balanced.
The proof runs as follows. First, we show that w(S)  v(S) for all S  N . Clearly
w(N) = v(N) and hence C(w)  C(v). Second, we show that a specic marginal vector
is in the core of the game (N;w). Hence, since C(w)  C(v), the same marginal vector
is also a core allocation of (N; v).
Theorem 4.1 shows the relation between the a 2-PS game and the related optimistic
game.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N; v) be the 2 PS game and (N;w) be the optimistic 2 PS game
arising from a simple 2 PS situation (M;N; (; ')), then it holds that w(N) = v(N)
and w(S)  v(S) for all S  N .
Proof. Clearly w(N) = v(N) and w(;) = 0. Let S  N , S 6= ;, S 6= N . By lemma
6.1 there exists an optimal scheme (̂; ̂) 2 A1(S)A2(S) for S such that for all i 2 S
it holds that
if (i)  '(i) then ̂(i)  ̂(i) and
if (i)  '(i) then ̂(i)  ̂(i).
Let (̂; ̂) be such a scheme. We dene the following sets:
S1 :=

i 2 S : (i) > '(i) or





i 2 S : (i) < '(i) or
(i) = '(i) and ̂(i) < ̂(i)

:
Note that S1 or S2 can be the empty set, and they form a partition of S. Then, for
any i 2 S1 it holds that
Ci(; ') = jfj 2 NnS : (j) < (i)gj+ 
S(i) and
Ci(̂; ̂ ) = jfj 2 NnS : (j) < (i)gj+ ̂
S(i).
Similarly, for any i 2 S2 it holds that
Ci(; ') = jfj 2 NnS : '(j) < '(i)gj+ '
S(i) and
Ci(̂; ̂ ) = jfj 2 NnS : '(j) < '(i)gj+ ̂
S(i).








(Ci(; ')   Ci(̂; ̂ )) +
P
i2S2





















Clearly, for all i 2 S1 it holds that Ci(
S ; 'S)  S(i) and for all i 2 S2 it holds
that Ci(






















'S(i)  (1 + 2 + :::+ jSj):
It remains to prove that,













̂S(i)  1 + 2 + :::+ jSj.
We distinguish between two cases:









̂S(i) = 1 + 2 + :::+ jSj.
Case 2: There is a pair of players i1 2 S1 and i2 2 S2 with ̂
S(i1) = ̂
S(i2).
We classify the positions 1; 2; :::; jSj of the scheme (̂S ; ̂S) in the following four classes.
F :=

k 2 f1; :::; jSjg : k = ̂S(i1) = ̂




k 2 f1; :::; jSjg : k = ̂S(i1) = ̂




k 2 f1; :::; jSjg : k = ̂S(i1) = ̂




k 2 f1; :::; jSjg : k = ̂S(i1) = ̂
S(i2) for some i1 2 S2 and i2 2 S2
	
.
First we observe that jF j = jEj. This holds since,
if jF j > jEj then
̂S(i1) : i1 2 S1	+ ̂S(i2) : i2 2 S2	 > jSj, and
if jF j < jEj then
̂S(i1) : i1 2 S1	+ ̂S(i2) : i2 2 S2	 < jSj.
Which both are contradictions, since S1 and S2 form a partition of S.
We dene for a position s 2 f1; :::; jSjg the following counters:
F (s) := fs; :::; jSjg \ F and




































= 1 + 2 + :::+ jSj
where the two equalities are trivial and the inequality is true if the following claim
holds.
Claim: F (s)  E(s) for all s 2 f1; :::; jSjg
Proof of the claim:
Suppose the contrary. Then there is a t 2 f1; :::; jSjg with F (t) < E(t). Let
s := max ft 2 f1; :::; jSjg : F (t) < E(t)g. It is easy to verify that F (s+1) = E(s+1).
Let m = F (s + 1). Let T := fs + 1; :::; jSjg be the positions from s +1 to jSj in the
scheme (̂S ; ̂S). Let p = jT \M1j and q = jT \M2j.




j(T [ fsg) \ (M2 [E)j = m+ q + 1 and
j(T [ fsg) \ (M2 [ F )j = m+ q.
Hence, there is a player i 2 S2 with,
̂S(i) 2 (T [ fsg) \ (M2 [E) and
̂S(i) =2 (T [ fsg) \ (M2 [ F ).
It is easy to check that
̂S(i) < s  ̂S(i): (3)
Using the same argument, replacing M2 by M1,
j(T [ fsg) \ (M1 [E)j = m+ p+ 1 and
j(T [ fsg) \ (M1 [ F )j = m+ p.
Hence, there is a player j 2 S1 with,
̂S(j) =2 (T [ fsg) \ (M1 [ F ) and
̂S(j) 2 (T [ fsg) \ (M1 [E).
Obviously i 6= j. It is easy to check that player j holds
̂S(j) < s  ̂S(j): (4)
Now, note that,
̂(i)  ̂(i) > ̂(j)  ̂(j); (5)
where the rst inequality follows from i 2 S2. The second inequality holds since (3)
and (4) imply ̂S(i)  s > ̂S(j). The third inequality follows from j 2 S1.
Note that (3) and (4) imply ̂S(j)  s > ̂S(i), which contradicts (5). This
completes the proof of the claim.













̂S(i)  1 + 2 + ::: + jSj. This completes the proof of the
theorem. 2
Now we have shown that for simple 2 PS situations, (M;N; (; ')) it holds that w  v
and w(N) = v(N). Consequently, C(w)  C(v). We are going to prove the balanced-
ness of the 2 PS game v arising from a simple 2 PS situation, by showing that a
specic marginal vector of the optimistic 2 PS game w lies in the core of w and hence
in the core of v. More precisely, the marginal vector of w with respect to the initial
order on the rst machine.
Let (N; v) be a TU game and  2
Q
(N) be an order for N , then the vector
m(v) 2 RN dened by
mi (v) := v(Pi() [ fig)  v(Pi()) for all i 2 N
is the marginal vector of v with respect to . The number mi (v) is the marginal
contribution of player i 2 N with respect to :
For any coalition S  N , the vector m;S(v) 2 RS dened by
m;Si (v) := v((Pi() \ S) [ fig)  v(Pi() \ S) for all i 2 S
is the marginal vector of v with respect to  and coalition S. The number m;Si (v) is
the marginal contribution of player i 2 S to coalition S with respect to . Notice that





m;Si (v) = v(S), which follows directly from the observation that
v(;) = 0 and that for any two players i; j 2 S, with j following i with respect to , i.e.,
j is the next player of S after i with respect to , it holds that
(Pi() \ S) [ fig = Pj() \ S.
We introduce some useful sets that will be of great help in proving the balancedness
of the optimistic game w arising from a simple 2 PS situation:
PF Si (; ') := fj 2 S : (j) < (i) and '(j) > '(i)g,
FP Si (; ') := fj 2 S : (j) > (i) and '(j) < '(i)g.
For any i 2 S  N , the set PF Si (; ') represents the players j 2 S that are
predecessors of i with respect to the order  and followers of i with respect to the order
'.
Similarly, for any i 2 S  N , the set FP Si (; ') represents the players j 2 S that
are followers of i with respect to the order  and predecessors of i with respect to the
order '.
It is easy to check that for any i 2 S  N it holds
'S(i) = S(i) +
FP Si (; ')   PF Si (; ') : (6)
The next example claries relation (6).
Example 4.1 Consider the simple 2 PS situation with:
N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, and the initial scheme given by

'
1 2 3 4 5
4 3 5 2 1
Take S = f1; 2; 3; 5g and i = 2, then we have
S
'S
1 2 3 5
3 5 2 1
and PF Si (; ') = 1, FP
S
i (; ') = f3; 5g which leads to
'S(i) = 3 = 2 + 2  1 = S(i) +
FP Si (; ')   PF Si (; '). M
Finally, we introduce the set
MSi (; ') :=





where Si = Pi() \ S.
Now, we can prove the balancedness of an optimistic 2-PS game.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N;w) be the optimistic game arising from a simple 2 PS situation




m;Ni (w) = w(N). Let S  N . Our aim is prove that
X
i2S






































Here the rst equality follows from lemma 6.2. The second equality is trivial. The rst





































Here the rst equality follows from lemma 6.2. The second equality is trivial. The third






































Clearly, if there is no k 2 S that holds (30) we are done with the proof. If this is
not the case, let us dene the following partition of S;
S1 := fi 2 S : i holds (30)g ;
S2 := fi 2 S : i does not hold (30)g :


































































































Here the rst inequality follows from lemma 6.6. The rst equality follows from the







m;Si (w)  0 and m
;N(w) 2 C(w): 2
Theorem 4.3 The marginal vector m;N (w) is in the core of the 2 PS game (N; v)
arising from any simple 2 PS situation.
Proof. From theorem 4.1 we have that w(S)  v(S) for all S  N , and w(N) = v(N).
Then C(w)  C(v). From theorem 4.2 we have that
m;N (w) 2 C(w). Consequently, m;N(w) 2 C(v). 2
Corollary 4.1 The marginal vector m';N(w), associated to the initial order on the
second machine ', lies in the core of the 2 PS game (N; v) arising from any simple
2 PS situation.
Proof. It is straightforward by switching the names of the machines. 2
5 Final remarks
Some of the results presented in Section 2 and 3 for 2 PS situations can easily be





where M = f1; :::;mg is a nite set of m machines. Now, each agent has m jobs to
be processed, one on each machine. It is readily seen that both Proposition 2.1 and
Proposition 2.2 can be generalized to m PS situations.
In section 3 we have introduced the 2 PS game v arising from a 2 PS situation.
The m PS game v is also monotonic and superadditive. Moreover, proposition 3.1
can be generalized as well. The optimistic m PS game w is easily derived for m PS
situations, and by the new proposition 2.2, the worth of a coalition S  N can still
easily be described.
We conclude with an open question: is w(S)  v(S) for any S  N?. It may be
of help in proving the balancedness of (N; v), which is also an open problem.
15
6 Appendix
This Appendix contains some technical Lemmata and some results that follow from
these Lemmata that are needed to prove Theorem 4.1 and 4.2.
Lemma 6.1 describes the existence of an optimal scheme of a coalition that satises
some monotony condition on the completion times.
Lemma 6.1 For a simple 2 PS situation (M;N; (; ')) it holds that for all S  N
there is an optimal scheme (̂; ̂) 2 A1(S)A2(S) such that for all i 2 S,
if (i)  '(i) then ̂(i)  ̂(i) and
if (i)  '(i) then ̂(i)  ̂(i).
Proof. Take S  N .
On the contrary, suppose that for all optimal schemes (̂; ̂) for S there exists a
player i 2 S such that either:
(i) > '(i) and ̂(i) < ̂(i) or (13)
(i) < '(i) and ̂(i) > ̂(i) . (14)
Given an optimal scheme for S, let us call players i 2 S for which (13) or (14)
is satised strange. Choose an optimal scheme (̂; ̂) for S such that the number of
strange players is minimal. We construct a new optimal scheme (~; ~) 2 A1(S)A2(S)
for S with one strange player less, which thus establishes a contradiction.
Let i be a strange player in S, without loss of generality, we may assume that i
satises (13).
Let T1 2 S= be such that i 2 T1 and T2 2 S=' be such that i 2 T2. Clearly
T1 and T2 have to overlap with respect to  and ', i.e., (T1) \ '(T2) 6= ;, where
(T1) = f(j) : j 2 T1g and '(T2) = f'(j) : j 2 T2g. Otherwise i could not be strange.
Note that S= = S=̂, S=' = S=̂ and (T1) = ̂(T1), '(T2) = ̂(T2).






Since i satises (13) it holds that ̂(i) 2 (T1) \ '(T2). Let i1 2 T1 be such that
̂(i1) = ̂(i). Note that i1 6= i.




̂(j) if j 2 Sn fi; i1g
̂(i1) if j = i
̂(i) if j = i1
:
It is easy to check that Cj(~; ~ )  Cj(̂; ̂ ) for all j 2 S. Hence, Cj(~; ~) = Cj(̂; ̂)
for all j 2 S since (̂; ̂ ) is an optimal scheme for S. Note that i is not strange anymore.
Moreover, if i1 was not strange with respect to (̂; ̂), it still is not, if it was strange, it
is still with respect to (~; ~). This follows from
~(i1) = ̂(i1) > ̂(i1) = ̂(i) > ̂(i) = ~(i1) (the rst inequality follows from
Ci1(~; ~) = Ci1(̂; ̂) and ~ = ̂). Furthermore, any other player in S remains un-
changed.


























We distinguish among three subcases:
A) If ̂(i) 2 (T1) \ '(T2).
We construct the new scheme (~; ~) 2 A1(S)A2(S) as in case I) and (~; ~ ) is an
optimal scheme for S with one strange player less. We arrive at a contradiction.
B) If ̂(i) =2 (T1) \ '(T2), but ̂(i) 2 (T1) \ '(T2).
Let i2 2 T2 be such that ̂(i) = ̂(i2). Note that i2 6= i.




̂(j) if j 2 Sn fi; i2g
̂(i2) if j = i
̂(i) if j = i2
:
Then clearly:
Ci(~; ~ ) = Ci(̂; ̂)  [̂(i)  ̂(i2)] ;
Ci2(~; ~)  Ci2(̂; ̂) + [̂(i)  ̂(i2)] and,
Cj(~; ~ ) = Cj(̂; ̂ ) for all j 2 Sn fi; i2g :
Note that ̂(i) > ̂(i) = ̂(i2). So, ̂(i)   ̂(i2) > 0. In fact,
Ci2(~; ~) = Ci2(̂; ̂) + [̂(i)  ̂(i2)] since (̂; ̂ ) is an optimal scheme for S.
Note that i is not strange anymore. Moreover, if i2 was not strange with respect
to (̂; ̂ ), it still is not, if i2 was strange, it is still with respect to (~; ~ ). This follows
from ~(i2) = ̂(i) > ̂(i) = ̂(i2) > ̂(i2) = ~(i2) (the second inequality follows from
Ci2(~; ~) = Ci2(̂; ̂) + [̂(i)   ̂(i2)] and ~ = ̂). Furthermore, any other player in S
remains unchanged.




















C) If ̂(i) =2 (T1) \ '(T2) and ̂(i) =2 (T1) \ '(T2).










All inequalities are trivial except for ̂(i) < min
j2T2
̂(j). Let us prove this inequality.
Suppose the contrary, ̂(i)  min
j2T2






'(j), it follows that ̂(i) 2 ̂(T1) \ ̂(T2) = (T1) \ '(T2), which
contradicts assumption C).









lows that for j 2 T1 \ T2 with (j) > '(j) it holds that (j); '(j) 2 (T1) \ '(T2).
From this observation it follows that,
jfj 2 T2 : j 2 T1 and (j) > '(j)gj  j(T1) \ '(T2)j   1: (15)
In view of (15), it follows from jfj 2 T2 : ̂(j) 2 (T1) \ '(T2)gj = j(T1) \ '(T2)j
that there is a player i2 2 T2 with ̂(i2) 2 (T1) \ '(T2) such that either i2 =2 T1 or
i2 2 T1 and (i2)  '(i2). Let i1 2 T1 be such that ̂(i1) = ̂(i2), with possibly i1 = i2.
Note that i 6= i1 and i 6= i2.
We construct the new scheme (~; ~ ) 2 A1(S)  A2(S) from (̂; ̂ ), by switching i




̂(j) if j 2 Sn fi; i1g
̂(i1) if j = i
̂(i) if j = i1
; and ~(j) :=
8<
:
̂(j) if j 2 Sn fi; i2g
̂(i2) if j = i
̂(i) if j = i2
:
Note that i is not strange anymore.
We distinguish two subsubcases:
a) i1 6= i2.
From the arguments in I) and II)B), the new scheme (~; ~) is optimal and there are
no new strange players. So, (~; ~) is an optimal scheme for S with one strange player



















b) i1 = i2. So, i2 2 T1.
We construct a new scheme (~; ~) 2 A1(S)A2(S) from (̂; ̂ ) by switching i2 and
i on both machines. Then ~(i2) = ̂(i) > ̂(i) = ~(i2).
We have chosen i2 2 T2 in such a way that either i2 =2 T1 or i2 2 T1 and
(i2)  '(i2): Since i2 2 T1, it holds that (i2)  '(i2). Hence, i2 is not a strange
player with respect to (~; ~ ). Furthermore, any other player in S remains unchanged.
Hence, there are no new strange players. Moreover, the nal completion time of i2
increases with the same amount as the nal completion time of i decreases.





















2 The following Lemma
provides a relation between m;Si (w) and M
S
i (; ').
Lemma 6.2 For all i 2 S  N it holds that m;Si (w) =
MSi (; ').
Proof. Let i be a player in S and  the initial order on the rst machine, then










Si ; 'Si)  (1 + :::+ jSij)
!
= Ci(





























MSi (; ') :
The second equality follows from (2). The fourth equality follows since i is the last
player of Si [ fig with respect to  and hence Ci(
Si[fig; 'Si[fig) = jSi [ figj.
The fth equality follows from, Cj('
Si[fig) = Cj('
Si) for all j 2 Si such that
'(j) < '(i) and Cj('
Si[fig) = Cj('
Si) + 1 for all j 2 Si such that '(j) > '(i).
Consequently, Cj(
Si[fig; 'Si[fig) = Cj(
Si ; 'Si)+1 for all j 2 Si such that '(j) > '(i)
and 'Si(j)  Si(j). And Cj(
Si[fig; 'Si[fig) = Cj(
Si ; 'Si) for any other player
j 2 Si. 2
In the following lemma we will calculate how many times a player k 2 S is in the
sets

MSi (; ') : i 2 S
	
.
Lemma 6.3 For all k 2 S  N it holds thati 2 S : k 2MSi (; ')	 = max 'S(k)  S(k); 0	.
Proof. First, note that for a player i 2 S, k 2 PF Si (; ') if and only if (k) < (i)
and '(k) > '(i) which is true if and only if i 2 FP Sk (; ').
From this and (7) we can write for the left hand side of the equality.i 2 S : k 2MSi (; ')	 = i 2 S : k 2 PF Si (; ') and 'Si(k)  Si(k)	
=
i 2 FP Sk (; ') : 'Si(k)  Si(k)	 :
Hence, i 2 S : k 2MSi (; ')	 = i 2 FP Sk (; ') : 'Si(k)  Si(k)	 : (16)
Let us now calculate
FP Sk (; '). Applying relation (6) to player k in S and in
Sk [ fkg we have that
'S(k) = S(k) +
FP Sk (; ')   PF Sk (; ') and (17)
'Sk[fkg(k) = Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sk[fkgk (; ')   PF Sk[fkgk (; ') : (18)
19
Subtracting (17)  (18) gives
'S(k)   S(k) + Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k) =
FP Sk (; ')   FP Sk[fkgk (; ')
 
PF Sk (; ') + PF Sk[fkgk (; ')
=
FP Sk (; ')
 
PF Sk (; ') + PF Sk[fkgk (; ')
=
FP Sk (; ')
where the second equality follows from FP
Sk[fkg
k (; ') = ; since k is the last player
in Sk [ fkg with respect to . The third equality follows from the observation that
PF
Sk[fkg
k (; ') = PF
S
k (; '), since the set of predecessors of k with respect to  in
Sk [ fkg is the same as in S. Hence,FP Sk (; ') = 'S(k)  S(k) + Sk[fkg(k)   'Sk[fkg(k)  0: (19)
Now, we focus on the dierence 'Si(k)   Si(k). Our aim is to show for which
players i in FP Sk (; ') it is non-negative. Let i 2 FP
S
k (; '). Applying (6) to k 2 Si
yields
'Si(k) = Si(k) +
FP Sik (; ')   PF Sik (; ') : (20)
Subtracting (20)  (18) we get
'Si(k)  Si(k) = 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k)
+
FP Sik (; ')   FP Sk[fkgk (; ')
 
PF Sik (; ') + PF Sk[fkgk (; ')
= 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k)
+
FP Sik (; ')
 
PF Sik (; ') + PF Sk[fkgk (; ')
= 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k)
+
FP Sik (; ')
where, using the same argument as before, the second equality follows from
FP
Sk[fkg
k (; ') = ;. The third equality follows from PF
Sk[fkg
k (; ') = PF
Si
k (; ').
Note that (i) > (k) and the set of predecessors of k with respect to  in Sk [ fkg is
the same as in Si. Hence,
'Si(k)  Si(k) = 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sik (; ') : (21)






From (19) and 'S(k)  S(k)  0 it follows thatFP Sk (; ')  Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k): (22)
Let i 2 FP Sk (; ') then by (21) we have that
'Si(k)  Si(k) = 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sik (; ')
< 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sk (; ')
 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) + Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k)
= 0:
20
Here the rst inequality follows from FP Sik (; ') $ FP
S
k (; '). Since Si  S, and any
follower of k with respect to  in Si is also a follower of k with respect to  in S.
Moreover, i 2 FP Sk (; '), but i =2 FP
Si
k (; '). The second inequality follows from (22).
Hence,





So, from (16) it follows thati 2 S : k 2MSi (; ')	 = i 2 FP Sk (; ') : 'Si(k)  Si(k)	 = 0,






Hence, 'S(k)  S(k) > 0. Then from (19) and Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k)  0,FP Sk (; ') = 'S(k)  S(k) + Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k) > 0 (23)
Now, let us dene a special player i 2 FP Sk (; '). Let i
 be such thati 2 FP Sk (; ') : (i) < (i)	 = Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k).
Player i exists because Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k)  0 since k is the last player in
Sk [ fkg with respect to . And in case II it holds thatFP Sk (; ')  Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k).
Let i 2 FP Sk (; ') be such that (i
)  (i). By (21) it holds that
'Si(k)  Si(k) = 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sik (; ')
 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sik (; ')
= 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) + Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k)
= 0
(24)
where the rst inequality follows from the observation that (i)  (i) which implies
FP
Si
k (; ')  FP
Si
k (; '). Since Si  Si, and any follower of k with respect to  in
Si is also a follower of k with respect to  in Si. The second equality follows from the
denition of i that clearly implies thatFP Sik (; ') = i 2 FP Sk (; ') : (i) < (i)	 = Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k): (25)
Now, let us consider i 2 FP Sk (; ') be such that (i
) > (i). By (21) it holds that
'Si(k)  Si(k) = 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sik (; ')
< 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) +
FP Sik (; ')
= 'Sk[fkg(k)  Sk[fkg(k) + Sk[fkg(k)  'Sk[fkg(k)
= 0
(26)
where the inequality follows from the observation that (i) > (i) which implies
FP
Si
k (; ') % FP
Si
k (; '). Since Si % Si, and any follower of k with respect to 
in Si is also a follower of k with respect to  in Si . Note that i 2 FP
Si
k (; '), but
i =2 FP Sik (; '). The second equality follows from (25).
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Hence, for any i 2 FP Sk (; ') with (i
)  (i) it holds that 'Si(k)   Si(k)  0.
And for any i 2 FP Sk (; ') with (i
) > (i) it holds that 'Si(k)  Si(k) < 0. Which
follows from (24) and (26), respectively. Consequently, by (16) we havei 2 S : k 2MSi (; ')	 = i 2 FP Sk (; ') : 'Si(k)  Si(k)	
=
i 2 FP Sk (; ') : (i)  (i)	
=
FP Sk (; ')   i 2 FP Sk (; ') : (i) < (i)	






where the fourth equality follows from (23) and (25). This completes the proof of case
II. 2
















'S(i)   S(i); 0
	
:
The next lemma is a technical one that is needed to give an lower bound on some
the sum of payos of the marginal vector in consideration.
Lemma 6.4 For all k 2 N and S  N it holds thati 2 S : k 2MNi (; ')	  max'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k); 0	.
Proof. Let k 2 N and S  N .
Note that the left hand side of the inequality can be written asi 2 S : k 2MNi (; ')	 = i 2 S : k 2 PFNi (; ') and 'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k)	
=
i 2 S : i 2 FPNk (; ') and 'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k)	
=
i 2 S : i 2 FP Sk (; ') and 'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k)	
=
i 2 FP Sk (; ') : 'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k)	 ;
where the rst equality follows from (7). The second equality follows from the fact
that k 2 PFNi (; ') if and only if i 2 FP
N
k (; '). The third and fourth equalities are
trivial. Hence,i 2 S : k 2MNi (; ')	 = ni 2 FP Sk (; ') : 'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k)o : (27)
By lemma 6.3, the right hand side of the inequality can be written as
max

'Pk()[S(k)   Pk()[S(k); 0
	
=
ni 2 Pk() [ S : k 2MPk()[Si (; ')o
=
ni 2 Pk() [ S : k 2 PFPk()[Si (; ') and '(Pk()[S)i(k)  (Pk()[S)i(k)o
=
ni 2 FPPk()[Sk (; ') : '(Pk()[S)i(k)  (Pk()[S)i(k)o
=
i 2 FP Sk (; ') : '(Pk()[S)i(k)  (Pk()[S)i(k)	 :
Here the rst equality follows from lemma 6.3. The second equality from (7). The
third equality from k 2 PF
Pk()[S
i (; ') if and only if i 2 FP
Pk()[S
k (; '). The last
equality from the observation that FP
Pk()[S
k (; ') = FP
S
k (; ') since the followers of








i 2 FP Sk (; ') : '(Pk()[S)i(k)  (Pk()[S)i(k)	 (28)
22
We will now compare (27) and (28). The next expression will be useful. Let i be a
player in FP Sk (; '). Applying relation (6) for player k in Pi() yields
'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k) =
FPPi()k (; ')   PFPi()k (; ')

FP (Pk()[S)ik (; ')   PF (Pk()[S)ik (; ')
= '(Pk()[S)i(k)   (Pk()[S)i(k)
where the last equality also follows from (6) applied to player k in (Pk() [ S)i. The
inequality follows from the observation that PF
Pi()
k (; ') = PF
(Pk()[S)i
k (; '), since
the predecessors of k with respect to  in (Pk()[S)i are precisely the predecessors of
k with respect to  in Pi(). And also from the observation that
FP
Pi()
k (; ')  FP
(Pk()[S)i
k (; ') since Pi()  Pi() \ (Pk() [ S) = (Pk() [ S)i,
and hence, any follower of k with respect to  in (Pk() [ S)i is also a follower of k
with respect to  in Pi(). Hence,
'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k)  '(Pk()[S)i(k)  (Pk()[S)i(k) (29)
So, we can writei 2 S : k 2MNi (; '	 = i 2 FP Sk (; ') : 'Pi()(k)  Pi()(k)	






where the rst equality follows from (27), the inequality follows from (29), and the nal
equality from (28) : 2







































Our aim now is to compare
P
i2S
m;Ni (w) and w(S) using those expressions. Clearly if














m;Si (w) = w(S) and we are done, since then











If this is the case we will focus on the study of the set of players j 2 NnS.
Let us introduce at this point some denitions of great help in the following. Let
k 2 S satisfy (30). We dene the player j 2 NnS and j 2 PFNk (; ') such thatj 2 NnS : j 2 PFNk (; ') and '(j) < '(j)	 = maxnPk()[S(k)  'Pk()[S(k); 0o
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Moreover, let us dene the set Gk as
Gk :=





That j and Gk are well-dened will be shown in the proof of lemma 6.5. In lemma
6.5 we focus on the cardinality of the set Gk. In lemma ?? we focus on the dierence
Pj()[S(j)   'Pj()[S(j) for players j 2 NnS.




















Proof. Let k 2 S satisfy (30) :
We focus rst on the cardinality of the set

j 2 NnS : j 2 PFNk (; ')
	
. Applying
(6) to k in Pk() [ S and k in S yields
'S(k)  S(k) =
FP Sk (; ')   PF Sk (; ') (31)
'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k) =
FPPk()[Sk (; ')   PFPk()[Sk (; ') : (32)
Subtracting (31)  (32) yields a useful expression for the cardinality of the set
j 2 NnS : j 2 PFNk (; ')
	
:





FP Sk (; ')   PF Sk (; ')
 


















j 2 NnS : j 2 PFNk (; ')	 :
Here the second equality follows from FP Sk (; ') = FP
Pk()[S
k (; ') since the followers
of k with respect to  in Pk() [ S are precisely the followers of k with respect to  in
S. The third equality follows from the observation that PF
Pk()[S
k (; ') = PF
N
k (; ')
since the predecessors of k with respect to  in Pk()[S are precisely the predecessors
of k with respect to  in N . The last equality is trivial. Hence,
j 2 NnS : j 2 PFNk (; ')	 = 'S(k)  S(k)  'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k) : (33)
In order to determine the cardinality of Gk we distinguish between two cases:
Case I: 'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)  0:












where the inequality follows from the assumption of case I and the assumption of the
lemma. So, j is well-dened. In particular, j is the rst player in (NnS)\PFNk (; ')
with respect to '. This implies that
Gk =

























Here the second equality follows from (33). The third equality follows from the as-
sumption of case I and the assumption of the lemma. This completes the proof of case
I.
Case II: 'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k) < 0:






The inequality follows since the rst term is positive by the assumption of the lemma
and the second term is negative by the assumption of case II. Then the player j is
well-dened and the set Gk, too.
Hence,
jGkj =
j 2 NnS : j 2 PFNk (; ') and '(j)  '(j)	
=
j 2 NnS : PFNk (; ')
 





















Here rst equality follows from the denition of Gk. The second and the fourth equal-
ities are trivial. The third equality follows from (33) and the denition of j. The fth
equality follows from the assumption of case II and the assumption of the lemma. This
completes the proof. 2
Lemma 6.6 For any player j 2 NnS it holds that










 0 and we are done.
Now, let j 2 NnS be such that jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj  1, i.e., j in Gk for some player
k 2 S satisfying (30).
We dene player k 2 S with j 2 Gk such that (k
) > (k) for all k 2 S with
j 2 Gk. In other words k
 is the last player of the set fk 2 S : j 2 Gkg with respect to
.
In order to nd a suitable expression for the dierence 'Pj()[S(j) Pj()[S(j) we
apply (6) to k in Pk() [ S and j in Pj() [ S,
'Pj()[S(j)  Pj()[S(j) =
FPPj()[Sj (; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ') (34)
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'Pk ()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k) =
FPPk()[Sk (; ')   PFPk()[Sk (; ') : (35)
Subtracting (34)  (35) yields,
'Pj()[S(j)   Pj()[S(j) = 'Pk ()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)
+
FPPj()[Sj (; ')   FPPk()[Sk (; ')
+
PFPk()[Sk (; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
= 'Pk ()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)
+
FPPj()[Sj (; ')   FPPk()[Sk (; ')
+
PFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
 'Pk ()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)
+
PFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
+ jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj :
(36)
Here the second equality follows from the observation that
PF
Pk()[S
k (; ') = PF
N
k(; ') since the predecessors of k
 with respect to  in
Pk() [ S are precisely the predecessors of k
 with respect to  in N . To prove the
inequality we will show thatFPPj()[Sj (; ')   FPPk()[Sk (; ')  jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj : (37)
The proof consists of two steps:
First step: Let i 2 FP
Pk()[S
k (; '), we will show that i 2 FP
Pj()[S
j (; ').
First, we see that i 2 Pj()[S. Since i is a follower of k
 in Pk()[S with respect
to , player i has to be in S and consequently in Pj() [ S.
Second, we see that (j) < (k) < (i) and '(j) > '(k) > '(i). Here the
rst inequality in both expressions follows from j 2 Gk and hence, j 2 PF
N
k(; ').
The second inequality in both expressions follows from i 2 FP
Pk()[S




Second step: Let k 2 S, k 6= k be such that j 2 Gk. We will show that
k 2 FP
Pj()[S
j (; ') and k =2 FP
Pk()[S
k (; ').
First, by assumption of j 2 Gk, we have that j 2 PF
N
k (; ') and hence,
k 2 FPNj (; '). Moreover, k 2 S and consequently, k 2 FP
Pj()[S
j (; ').
Second, by denition of k it holds that (k) < (k) and consequently,
k =2 FP
Pk()[S
k (; '). Which follows easily since k cannot be a follower of k
 with
respect to . Notice that k 2 FP
Pj()[S




From the two steps it follows that (37) holds. Hence, (36) holds. Hence,
'Pj()[S(j)   Pj()[S(j)  'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)
+
PFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
+ jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj :
(38)
We continue with studying expression (38). We distinguish between two cases:
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Case I: 'Pk ()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)  0:
In this case we can write:
'Pj()[S(j)  Pj()[S(j)  'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)
+
PFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
+ jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj

PFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
+ jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj
> jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj :
Here the rst inequality follows from (38). The second inequality follows from the
assumption of case I. To prove the third inequality we will show that
PF
Pj()[S
j (; ') $ PF
N
k(; ').
Let i be a player in PF
Pj()[S
j (; ') then we will show that i 2 PF
N
k(; '). First,
clearly i 2 N . Second, (i < (j) < (k) and '(i) > '(j) > '(k). Here the rst
inequality in both expressions follows from i 2 PF
Pj()[S
j (; '). The second inequality
in both expressions follows from j 2 Gk and hence, j 2 PF
N
k(; '). So, i 2 PF
N
k(; ').
Notice that j 2 PFNk(; '), but j =2 PF
Pj()[S
j (; ').






> jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj :
And this completes the proof of case I.
Case II 'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k) < 0:
In this case we can write:
'Pj()[S(j)  Pj()[S(j)  'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)
+
PFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
+ jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj
> 'Pk()[S(k)  Pk()[S(k)
 'Pk()[S(k) + Pk()[S(k)
+ jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj
= jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj :
Here the rst inequality follows from (38). The equality is trivial. We prove the second
inequality by showing thatPFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ') > Pk()[S(k)  'Pk ()[S(k).
The proof consists of three steps:
First step: PF
Pj()[S
j (; ')  PF
N
k(; ').
Let i 2 PF
Pj()[S
j (; ') we will show that i 2 PF
N
k(; '). Clearly i 2 N . Moreover,
(i) < (j) < (k) and '(i) > '(j) > '(k). Here the rst inequality in both
expressions follows from i 2 PF
Pj()[S
j (; '). The second inequality in both expressions
follows from j 2 Gk and hence, j 2 PF
N
k(; '). So, i 2 PF
N
k (; ').
Second step: Let i 2 NnS; i 2 PFNk(; ') be such that '(i) < '(j
)  '(j), where
the second inequality follows from the assumption of j 2 Gk . It is easy to see that
i =2 PF
Pj()[S
j (; '). Which follows since by the assumption of '(i) < '(j), i cannot
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be a follower of j with respect to '. Moreover, clearly j =2 PF
Pj()[S
j (; '), but by the
assumption of j 2 Gk, j 2 PF
N
k(; ').
Third step: Now we are going to count the number of player of the setPFNk(; ')   PFPj()[Sj (; ')
=
PFNk(; ')nPFPj ()[Sj (; ')
 jfjgj+
i 2 NnS : i 2 PFNk(; ') and '(i) < '(j)	
>
i 2 NnS : i 2 PFNk(; ') and '(i) < '(j)	

i 2 NnS : i 2 PFNk(; ') and '(i) < '(j)	
= Pk()[S(k)  'Pk()[S(k)
Here the rst equality follows from step one. The rst inequality follows from step two.
The second inequality is trivial. The third inequality follows from j 2 Gk , and hence
'(j)  '(j). The last equality follows from the denition of j and the assumption of
case II.






> jfk 2 S : j 2 Gkgj :
And this completes the proof of case II. 2
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